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Abstract—We study a notion of guesswork, where multiple
agents intend to launch a coordinated brute-force attack to
find a single binary secret string, and each agent has access
to side information generated through either a BEC or a BSC.
The average number of trials required to find the secret string
grows exponentially with the length of the string, and the rate
of the growth is called the guesswork exponent. We compute
the guesswork exponent for several multi-agent attacks. We
show that a multi-agent attack reduces the guesswork exponent
compared to a single agent, even when the agents do not
exchange information to coordinate their attack, and try to
individually guess the secret string using a predetermined scheme
in a decentralized fashion. Further, we show that the guesswork
exponent of two agents who do coordinate their attack is strictly
smaller than that of any finite number of agents individually
performing decentralized guesswork.
Index Terms—Guesswork; brute-force attack; coordinated at-
tack.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a setup where a system is protected using a
passwordXn ∈ Xn, drawn i.i.d. at random from a distribution
pX(·) on the finite alphabet X . An adversary wishes to breach
the system by guessing the password. Assuming n is known to
the adversary, a brute-force attack on the system would consist
of first producing a list of all of the |X |n strings in Xn ordered
from the most likely to the least likely with respect to pXn(·),
and then exhausting the list one by one until successfully
guessing the password. Let the guesswork, denoted byG(Xn),
be defined as the position at which the password string Xn
appears in the adversary’s list of all strings. The guesswork
G(Xn) can be thought of as the computational cost in terms
of number of queries required of an adversary to breach the
system. As shall be discussed, G(Xn) grows exponentially
with n for the processes considered in this paper, and the rate
of its growth is referred to as the guesswork exponent.
If m adversarial agents coordinate their attack on the secret
string, the system will be compromised as soon as either of
them succeeds, and hence, the average guesswork is reduced.
Indeed, an optimal strategy would consist here of having each
agent query the most likely sequence that has not yet been
queried by any of the other agents. As the length of the
password n grows, the impact of finitely many agents becomes
more and more negligible, and since the size of the list grows
exponentially in n, dividing the list by a constant does not
change the guesswork exponent.
In this work, we further assume that the agents have
access to a side information string Y n, which they use to
construct an updated list of strings, this time ordered with
respect to pXn|Y n(·|Y
n). In its most general form, this side
information can model complex additional information that the
adversary may have acquired on the choice of the password,
ranging from background search on the user who chose
the password, to simply behind the back attacks in which
an illegitimate person observes parts of the password. For
example, considering Y n to be the output of a binary erasure
channel can model an agent who has acquired parts of the
secret password in the clear. Consider now a case in which
multiple adversaries try to guess the password, each having
access to some side information Y n(i), which is assumed to
be generated independently given Xn through some discrete
memoryless channel. Contrary to the case where there is no
side information, we demonstrate that having even a fixed
number of agents can help in reducing the exponent of the
guesswork — whether they coordinate and use their side
information in a centralized manner, or try independently
in a decentralized way to guess the password (see Fig. 2).
We illustrate the impact of multiple agents by studying both
the centralized and the decentralized mechanisms for side
information provided through the binary symmetric channel
(BSC) and the binary erasure channel (BEC).
This setting can also indirectly model adversaries and users
over multiple accounts, some of which have been compro-
mised. Suppose a user has several accounts, each requiring a
password. The user may decide to use one identical password
for all of the accounts, where the compromise of one of the
accounts puts in peril all of his accounts. On the other extreme,
he may decide to use completely independent passwords for
each of the accounts, in which case one password being
compromised does not give away any information on any of
the other passwords. In practice, most users settle for a solution
in between these two extremes. For example, the user may
choose to slightly tweak their passwords from one account
to another as to avoid the disastrous consequences of one
account being compromised providing access to the rest of
the accounts, while still maintaining some convenience. In
this case, if one password is compromised, an adversary gains
some side-information about the rest of the passwords.
The normalized moments of guesswork are of great interest
as they provide operational meanings in several information
theoretic problems. For any α > 0, let Eα(pX) denote the
guesswork exponent and be defined as
Eα(pX) :=
1
α
lim
n→∞
1
n
logE{[G(Xn)]α},
Fig. 1: In the centralized mechanism, a single list is con-
structed by collecting all the side-informations. In the decen-
tralized setting, each agent constructs a separate list.
where the expectation is with respect to the measure pX . Fur-
ther, let E0(pX) := limα→0 Eα(pX). For example, E1(pX)
is the exponential growth rate of the expected number of
queries required of the adversary to breach the secret string,
and E0(pX) is the average codeword rate in optimal one
shot source coding [1], [2]. Similarly, one can extend these
notions to guesswork with side-information. The conditional
guesswork, denoted G(Xn|Y n), can be thought of as the
computational cost of an agent who has acquired side infor-
mation Y n. The conditional guesswork exponent Eα(pX,Y )
then describes the exponential rate of conditional guesswork.
Related Work:We briefly mention some related work. Guess-
work was first considered in [3], where it was shown that
guesswork is not necessarily related to the Shannon entropy.
In [4], it is shown that the moments of guesswork for i.i.d.
sequences are related to the Rényi-entropy of the source. Since
then, this was generalized to various source processes (see [5],
[6]), and under source uncertainty in [7]. In [8], guesswork
is shown to satisfy a large deviation principle. [9] studies
guesswork subject to distortion. A geometric perspective on
guesswork is introduced in [10]. Guesswork, as a metric for
quantifying the computational effort of brute-force attacks
has been studied under various settings: under an entropy
constraint in [11], over the typical set in [12], multiple
users in [13], with erasures in [14]. Guesswork is central to
several other problems in information theory, ranging from
the computational cost of sequential decoding [4], to the error
exponent in list decoding [15].
Main Contribution: In this paper, we consider the guess-
work exponent under two types of side information, namely
BECǫ and BSCδ , where ǫ and δ are the respective channel
parameters. We characterize the impact of multiple agents in
this setting, and show that even a finite number of agents
reduces the conditional guesswork exponent. We carry this out
by considering two extreme settings, one in which the agents
are guessing the password, individually and independently
(decentralized mechanism), and one in which all the side
information is collected and used collectively (centralized
mechanism). Section II introduces the setting along with some
notations and background on guesswork with side information.
Results for the BECǫ and BSCδ are presented in Section III
and Section IV, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
Let (Xn, Y n) := (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn), where (Xi, Yi) ∈
X × Y , denote a random string of length n drawn i.i.d.
from a distribution pX,Y over some finite alphabet X × Y .
The sequence Xn can be thought of as the password to
guess, while the sequence Y n can be thought of as side
information. The conditional guesswork E [G(Xn|Y n)] is then
the computational cost of the adversary with side information
Y n. For β > 0, β 6= 1, we denote by Hβ(X) and Hβ(X |Y ),
respectively, the Rényi-entropy and conditional Rényi-entropy
of order β, defined in the usual way:
Hβ(X) =
β
1− β
log
(∑
x
pX(x)
β
)1/β
,
Hβ(X |Y ) =
β
1− β
log

∑
y
(∑
x
pX,Y (x, y)
β
)1/β .
We will focus on the case of binary input alphabets, i.e., X =
{0, 1}. For 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, we denote by Hβ(p) the binary
Rényi entropy of order β, and by H(p) the binary Shannon
entropy. Furthermore, we let D(p||q) be defined as the KL-
divergence between two binary distributions parameterized by
p and q, respectively, that is:
D(p||q) = p log
p
q
+ (1− p) log
1− p
1− q
. (1)
Given an observation Y n = yn, we denote by G(Xn|Y n =
yn) the position of Xn in the list of ordered sequences xn
from most likely to least likely according to pXn|Y n(·|y
n). The
conditional Guesswork E [G(Xn|Y n)α] is then the average∑
yn pY n(y
n)E [G(Xn|Y n = yn)α]. We are interested in the
conditional guesswork exponent defined as
Eα(pX,Y ) := lim
n→∞
1
n
logE[G(Xn|Y n)α], (2)
for α > 0. An application of L’Hopital’s rule yields the
following useful equality:
lim
α→0
1
α
Eα(pX,Y ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
E [log(G(Xn|Y n))] . (3)
In a seminal result, Arıkan [4] showed that the moments α of
guesswork are related to the Renyi entropies of order 11+α of
the source, that is:
Eα(pX,Y ) = αH 1
1+α
(X |Y ). (4)
When the input distribution pX is clear from context, we may
write Eα(pY |X). We use f(n)
.
= g(n), if limn→∞
log f(n)
log g(n) =
1. Logarithms and exponents are in base 2.
B. Background on Noise and Erasures
For the remainder of the paper, we will suppose that Xn
is a uniform Bernoulli sequence, and we will be interested
in two families of side information. Namely, we will let Y n
be the output of Xn through a binary symmetric channel
(BSCδ), or through a binary erasure channel (BECǫ). We will
use the notation Eα(BSCδ) and Eα(BECǫ), to denote each
corresponding exponent, where it is implicit that the input
distribution pXn is chosen to be uniform over binary sequences
of length n.
BSC: Let Y n be the output of Xn through a BSC with flip-
over probability δ ≤ 1/2. Noting that Xn = Y n + Zn,
where the addition operation is over Z2, it is easy to see that
G(Xn|Y n) = G(Zn), and the average guesswork is given by:
Eα(BSCδ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
logE[G(Zn)α] = αH1/(1+α)(δ). (5)
BEC: Let Y n be the output ofXn through a BEC channel with
erasure probability 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1. Denote by En the number of
erasures. Then, we have that G(Xn|Y n) = G(X ′En), where
X ′En is the erased sequence. It has been shown in [14], using
results from large deviation theory, that the α-th moment
of guesswork in this setting (referred to as subordinated
Guesswork in [14]) is:
Eα(BECǫ) = sup
λ∈[0,1]
(αλ −D(λ||ǫ)) . (6)
Specifically, for α = 1, the exponent of the average guesswork
is given by:
lim
n→∞
1
n
logE[G(XEn)] = log (1 + ǫ) . (7)
Finally, the following lemma which we will use in the
proofs, characterizes the guesswork exponent of a sequence
generated by the concatenation of a uniform binary sequence,
and an arbitrary i.i.d. sequence.
Lemma 1. Let U ∼ Ber(1/2) and V ∼ Ber(p), with p ≤
1/2, and denote by Umn and V n−mn their i.i.d. sequences,
for some sequence mn such that limn→∞
mn
n = λ. Then, the
guesswork exponent for the sequence Xn = (Umn , V n−mn)
obtained by the concatenation of Umn and V n−mn is:
lim
n→∞
1
n
logE [G(Xn)α] = λα+ (1− λ)αH1/1+α(p). (8)
Proof Sketch. The result follows from the fact that we need
to guess the subsequence V n−mn , but each such subsequence
has 2mn uniform possibilities for Umn .
C. Setting
As shown above, the problem of Guesswork under side
information is well understood. A more complicated problem
is one in which multiple agents receive side information, and
not a single source of side information. Precisely, let there
be m agents, each observing an independent realization of a
side information Y n(i), i = 1, . . . ,m, where Y
n
(i) is the output
of the password sequence Xn through a discrete memory-less
channel. Clearly, if all the agents cooperate and share their side
information, they can construct an optimal list based on the ag-
gregate collection of side information Y ′ = (Y n(1), . . . , Y
n
(m)).
This strategy clearly out performs the strategy in which each
agent tries to guess the sequence on its own. However, it is not
clear to which extent this sharing of side information improves
the exponent with respect to a decentralized approach. To
answer this question, we consider the two families of side
information we already introduced, namely BECǫ and BSCδ,
and characterize the conditional guesswork exponent under the
two following strategies, illustrated in Fig. 1:
Decentralized Mechanism: Each of the m agents tries to
guess Xn based on its own observation Y n(i). The process
ends when at least one of the agents correctly guesses Xn.
The conditional guesswork exponent for this strategy, denoted
E
(d)
α (pmY |X), is therefore:
1
α
E(d)α (p
m
Y |X) =
1
α
lim
n→∞
1
n
logE
[
min
i=1,...,m
{
G(Xn|Y n(i))
α
}]
.
(9)
Centralized: The agents share their observations Y n(i), i =
1, . . . ,m with a central authority who collapses the side infor-
mation and constructs an optimal list based on pX|Y(1),...,Y(m) .
The conditional guesswork exponent for this strategy is de-
noted by E(c)α (p
m
Y |X), and:
E(c)α (p
m
Y |X) = Eα(pY ′|X), (10)
where Y ′ = (Y1, . . . , Y(m)) and pY ′|X(y1, . . . , ym|x) =∏m
i=1 pY |X(yi|x).
Note that it follows directly that E(d)α (p
1
Y |X) =
E
(c)
α (p1Y |X) = Eα(pY |X).
In the rest of the paper, we will characterize the conditional
guesswork exponents under BECǫ and BSCδ side information.
Precisely, we let Y n(1), . . . , Y
n
(m) be the output ofX
n throughm
independent BSCδ or BECǫ channels. Note that, even though
the initial channel is a simple binary channel, the resulting
channel from the collapsing of the side information may be
more complex. This will be the case for BSC. In the next
section, we analyze the guesswork exponent for the BEC side
information. The analysis for the BSC is in Section IV.
It has to be noted that we are studying asymptotic behaviors
for fixed m, that is m does not grow with n. In the sequel,
we may take the limit when m → ∞ and determine say
limm→∞E
(c)
α (p
m
Y |X), where E
(c)
α (p
m
Y |X) is itself the result of
a limit when n → ∞. It is understood here that the order of
the limits is crucial and an interchange of limit is not possible.
III. BEC
A. Centralized Mechanism
The BECǫ is simple to analyze because collapsing infor-
mation is tractable. In particular, the symbol in position i
in the sequence Xn is erased in all received signals Y ni
with probability ǫm. Therefore, the resulting collapsed random
variable Y˜ n is the output of Xn through a BEC with erasure
probability ǫm, and we have the following.
Theorem 1. The guesswork exponent for the centralized
Mechanism with m agents under BEC is:
E(c)α (BEC
m
ǫ ) = max
λ∈[0,1]
(αλ−D(λ‖ǫm)) . (11)
Carrying out the maximization for α = 1, we have the
following.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of centralized and decentralized settings
for the BEC.
Corollary 1. The centralized Mechanism withm agents under
BEC side information has expected Guesswork exponent (see
Fig. 2):
E
(c)
1 (BEC
m
ǫ ) = log (1 + ǫ
m) . (12)
Remark 1. The function f(x) = log(1+xm) over x ∈ [0, 1],
is convex for any m ≥ 2. Moreover, as the number of
agents increases, the exponents tends towards a flat function
E(c)α = 0, with a discontinuity at ǫ = 1. Moreover, since the
first derivative (when α = 1) is m ǫ
m−1
1+ǫm for any m ≥ 2,
the centralized curve starts flat with a negligible exponent for
small ǫ.
B. Decentralized Mechanism
The study of the decentralized case is more involved since,
on the one hand, one cannot construct a unified list based
on all
{
Y n(i)
}m
i=1
, yet, on the other hand, the guesswork
random variables G
(
Xn|Y n(i)
)
are not independent and one
cannot easily combine
{
G
(
Xn|Y n(i)
)}m
i=1
. First, we discuss
the result:
Theorem 2. The decentralized mechanism with BEC side-
information has Guesswork Exponent:
E(d)α (BEC
m
ǫ ) = sup
λ∈[0,1]
(αλ−mD(λ||ǫ)) . (13)
Before we proceed to the proof, some remarks are in order.
One can verify that the limit of the Guesswork Exponent
for the decentralized mechanism, as the number of agents
m increases, converges towards ǫ (see Fig 2). Indeed, for
large m, the term −mD(λ‖ǫ) dominates, and the solution
of the optimization is λ ≃ ǫ. On the other hand, Remark 1
establishes that the Guesswork exponent is convex for any
m ≥ 2, implying that even two agents that collapse their
side information are more powerful than any finite number
of agents guessing Xn in a decentralized way. Note that
this claim has to be nuanced. Indeed, we are looking at the
asymptotic behavior of the guesswork exponent as n→∞, for
a fixed number of agents, i.e., this does not allow a growing
number of agents with n.
Proof Sketch. The proof of Thm 2 follows from two steps.
First, we establish an upper bound based on the shortest
sequence. Due to space restrictions, we provide below only
a proof sketch in the case of m = 2. First, we find an upper
bound on the guesswork exponent by considering the exponent
of the shortest sequence. The details are omitted, but follow
from a standard use of the method of types.
E[ min
i=1,...,m
{G(XE
(i)
n )α}] ≤ E[G(XE
∗
n)α]. (14)
where E∗n is the random variable representing the minimum
number of erasures among all m agents. Therefore, we have:
E(d)α (BEC
m
ǫ ) ≤ sup
λ∈[0,1]
(αλ−mD(λ‖ǫ)) . (15)
To obtain a matching lower-bound, we consider an oracle
that provides additional information to both agents, strictly
reducing their guesswork. In general terms, the additional
information from the oracle allows to construct explicitly the
optimal list of both agents. More precisely, this is achieved
by transmitting the position of the common erasures for both
agent. The optimal joint strategy is then to construct lists as
to minimize queries that have a common subsequence in the
overlapping erasures. Indeed, each incorrect query from an
agent, shapes the probability distribution of the second agent
because of the common sequences. We show that this proba-
bility shaping, can be again lower-bounded by a mechanism
in which each agent has two guesses at each step, instead of
one, therefore not affecting the guesswork exponent.
IV. BSC
A. Centralized Mechanism
In the case of the BSCδ, the centralized mechanism is more
involved to analyze. Indeed, the resulting channel BSCmδ is
not a BSC anymore, since one has m noisy measurements per
password-bit. Indeed, as it will be clear soon, guessing should
be preceded with some kind of estimation. Nevertheless, for
m = 2, we can characterize precisely what this channel exactly
is, by considering the 2m = 4 cases. We will then discuss how
to generalize this result to arbitrary m > 2.
Theorem 3. The centralized mechanism with m = 2 agents
under BSCδ side-information satisfies:
E(c)α (BSC
2
δ) = sup
λ∈[0,1]
(
αλH1/1+α
(
δ2
1− 2δ(1− δ)
)
+
α(1 − λ)−D (λ‖2δ(1− δ))
)
.
Corollary 2. The average guesswork, when α = 1, is (Fig. 3)
E
(c)
1 (BSC
2
δ) = log(4δ(1 − δ) + 1). (16)
Proof. Denote by Y n1 and Y
n
2 the sequence of side information
observed by each agent, and divide each into two parts. In the
first part, Y n1 and Y
n
2 agree and have the same bit in every
position, that is on this subsequence, the centralized Y˜ n is es-
sentially the result of a BSC with parameter δ2/(1−2δ(1−δ)).
In the second part, they disagree and have contradicting bits
in every position, which is essentially an erasure. We let
λ ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of bits over which they agree, i.e. λn
is the size of the first subsequence defined above. Therefore,
the central authority has to guess a sequence of the type
X˜n = (U˜n(1−λ), Z˜nλ), where U˜n(1−λ) is an i.i.d. sequence
of uniform Bernoulli random variables that correspond to the
erasures, and Znα is an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli random
variables with parameter δ˜ , δ2/(1−2δ(1−δ)). By Lemma 1,
we have that:
lim
n→∞
1
n
logE[G(X˜n)α] = λα+ (1− λ)αH1/1+α(δ˜). (17)
Noting that the probability of the subsequence of agree-
ments to be of length λn is (up to polynomial factors)
exp {−nD(λ‖2δ(1− δ))}, we get the desired optimization.
Solving for α = 1 yields the corollary.
Note that one can easily verify the following
log(4δ(1− δ) + 1) ≤ H(δ), (18)
with equality only if δ = 1/2 or δ = 0.
The previous theorem only treats the case of m = 2 agents,
although a similar technique can be used to tackle any m ≥ 2
number of agents. Unfortunately, this method is intractable for
large m. However, the following result allows us to compute
the limit as the number of agents grows to infinity:
Lemma 2. Let δ < 12 , then:
lim
m→∞
E(c)α (BSC
m
δ ) = 0. (19)
Proof. For a fixed n and m, we do a deterministic pre-
processing on the sequences Y n(1), . . . , Y
n
(m), which can only
increase the guesswork, by definition. Namely, we let Y˜i
be defined as the majority bit among the received side-
informations at index i, that is :
Y˜i =
{
0 ,if Ni(0) ≥ Ni(1),
1 ,if Ni(0) < Ni(1),
(20)
where Ni(0) =
∑m
j=1 Y(j),i, for Y(j),i the i-th bit of the
sequence Y n(j), and Ni(1) = n−Ni(0). Then, it is easy to see
that Y˜ n is the output of Xn through a BSC with parameter
δm, such that δm → 0 as m→∞ for any δ < 1/2. Therefore,
we have, for any n, and for fixed m, the following inequality:
E[G(Xn|Y ′)α] ≤ E[G(Xn|Y˜ n)α] (21)
⇒ E(c)α (BSC
m
δ ) ≤ Eα(BSCδm) (22)
⇒ lim
m→∞
E(c)α (BSC
m
δ ) ≤ limm→∞
Eα(BSCδm). (23)
As the right hand side of the last inequality converges to 0 for
any δ < 12 , we obtain the desired result.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of the centralized and decentralized setting
for BSC.
In other words, when m is large enough, one can estimate
each bit of the password based on the noisy observations.
B. Decentralized Mechanism
In contrast with the BEC case, when the side-information
Y n(i) is the result of a BSC, the resulting guessworks are
independent. Indeed, as stated before G(Xn|Y n(i)) = G(Z
n
(i)),
where now the sequences of flips Zn(i) are independent. The
following result, which is a special case of the more general
large deviation result in [13] follows directly:
Theorem 4. The decentralized mechanism with m agents un-
der BSC side-information has expected Guesswork exponent:
E(d)α (BSC
m
δ ) = αH mα+m (δ). (24)
Alternative Proof. For completeness, we provide a proof that
does not require to evaluate the full large deviation behavior
of the guesswork to evaluate its moments. First we recall the
following elementary result. Let Sni be the sum of n i.i.d. coin
flips with parameter δ. Then, for any δ < s ≤ 1:
Pr( min
i=1...,m
Si = sn) = mPr(S1 = sn)
m∏
i=2
Pr(Si ≥ sn)
(25)
.
= exp{−nD(s||δ)} (exp{−nD(s||δ)})
m−1
(26)
.
= exp{−nmD(s||δ)}. (27)
Alternatively, when 0 < s ≤ δ, we have:
Pr
(
min
i=1,...,m
Si = sn
)
.
= exp{−nD(s||δ)}. (28)
Using the previous results, and recalling that G(Zn(i))
.
= 2S
n
i ,
where Sni is the number of 0’s in the sequence (the type of
the binary sequence), we obtain that:
E[ min
i=1,...,m
G(Zn(i))
α]
.
= exp
{
n sup
λ∈[0,1]
(αλ− f(λ,m))
}
,
(29)
where f(λ,m) = 1{λ > δ}mD(λ||δ) + 1{λ ≤ δ}D(λ||δ).
The desired result follows by observing that the maximization
over λ always lead to a solution in the range λ > δ, for any
α > 0.
Remark 2. The limit when m → ∞ of the decentralized
setting tends to the Shannon entropy αH(δ) for any α > 0.
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